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1 
The foreclosure crisis that began in 2008 triggered the need for 
new approaches to treat distressed mortgages.  A key 
component of the Obama Administration’s Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) was the development of a 
standardized Net Present Value (NPV) model to identify 
troubled loans that were value-enhancing candidates for 
payment-reducing modifications.  This paper discusses the 
development of the HAMP NPV model, its purpose, and some 
important constraints that dictated its structure and limitations.  
We describe the structure and the estimation of the model in 
detail.  Furthermore, we describe the responsiveness of the 
model to key characteristics, such as loan to value and credit 
score and provide new evidence on the relationship between 
HAMP modification performance and key borrower and 
modification characteristics.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion of model limitations and suggestions for further 
refinement of the model. 
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Authors’ Note:  The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is arguably the federal 
government’s most important intervention into housing markets to encourage loan modifications for 
distressed homeowners.  The creation and rollout of the Net Present Value (NPV) model was a 
critical innovation in HAMP and has played an important role in the program.  James Berkovec 
played an important role in developing the first version of the NPV, directing the development of the 
default model and offering substantial leadership and guidance throughout the process.
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The first decade of the 21
st
 century was as tumultuous for the housing sector as any in recent 
history.  A sharp increase in housing-market activity, marked by a dramatic acceleration in 
home prices and new mortgage originations, was followed by a bust, during which 
delinquencies soared and housing prices plummeted.  The housing bust was marked by a 
nearly unprecedented increase in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures; in the first quarter 
of 2010 the Mortgage Bankers Association's national delinquency survey experienced the 
highest ever rates of delinquency in the series’ history.    The spike in defaults and decline in 
home values resulting in the collapse of non-prime MBS values was one of the chief 
proximate causes of the financial crisis.   
The federal government took a number of extraordinary actions to address the crisis, 
including a series of efforts aimed at foreclosure avoidance.  The largest of these efforts was 
the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), launched in early 2009 using funding 
from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  As of the first quarter of 2011, HAMP had 
initiated over 1.5 million trial modifications and made permanent over 670,000 
modifications.  Over one hundred servicers accounting for about 80 percent of outstanding 
residential mortgage debt being serviced signed up to participate in HAMP. 
HAMP was designed to facilitate bulk processing of loan modifications by requiring and 
subsidizing a specific streamlined modification structure, which could be evaluated by a 
single, batch-process decision-making framework.  Most pooling and servicing agreements 
require servicers to increase the value of cash flows to investors. In the context of 
modifications this can be interpreted as a requirement for present value improving 
modifications. HAMP was therefore designed to provide both a decision-making framework 
to neutrally assess the value of a specific modification structure and subsidies for mortgage 
investors to increase the value of modified loans. 
HAMP emphasized bulk processing and a streamlined modification structure because at the 
beginning of the foreclosure crisis large mortgage servicers were unprepared for the 
overwhelming volumes of seriously delinquent loans and had minimal infrastructure for 
evaluating these loans for loss mitigation.  The design of HAMP also reflects the 
 understanding that in many cases loan modifications that would be value-improving for 
investors relative to foreclosure were not being identified and executed as a result of 
obstacles within the existing market structure.
2
  In HAMP, value-enhancing modifications 
are identified using the Net Present Value (NPV) model.  The NPV Model compares the 
expected discounted cash flows associated with the modification of a loan – considering 
probabilities of default – under two scenarios: the loan is modified according to HAMP terms 
and the loan is not modified (hereafter referred to as “mod” and “no-mod”).  A loan that is 
NPV “positive” – where the value of the probability-weighted mod cash flows exceed the 
value of the probability-weighted no-mod cash flows – is considered to be a good candidate 
for modification.  Testing modifications for positive NPV generally eliminates borrowers 
who are very unlikely to be foreclosed upon or who have substantial positive equity, because 
in both cases the mortgagee or lien-holder is unlikely to suffer meaningful losses in the no-
mod case.  The NPV test also eliminates borrowers for whom a modification does not 
meaningfully reduce their prospects of foreclosure.  In these cases the costs of the 
modification in terms of reduced cash flows are not balanced by a reduced probability of 
foreclosure.  
This paper provides a review of the development, mechanics, and operation of the HAMP 
NPV model, introduces initial measures of the performance of the model, and offers a view 
of future challenges to the evaluation of modifications
3
.  The paper is organized as follows.  
Section I discusses the HAMP program design.  Section II describes the development of the 
NPV model, Section III discusses the workings of the NPV model, Section IV provides 
simulation and empirical results that provide insight into the model outcomes.  Section V 
discusses limitations of the model, describes future challenges and opportunities, and 
concludes. 
I. HAMP Program Design 
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 See Cordell et al. (2008) for a discussion of institutional barriers to loan modification and Foote et al. (2009) 
and Adelino et al. (2009) discuss economic barriers to loan modification. 
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 The authors represent the working group tasked with development and enhancement of the NPV evaluation 
tool.  The tool was designed to implement the administration’s HAMP policy.  A discussion of the policy 
choices that influenced the design of the NPV model is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 HAMP facilitates rapid, objective evaluation of loan modifications by providing a batch 
decision-making tool (the NPV model) and a standardized modification structure.  The 
program provides subsidies for servicers to conduct modifications, potentially ameliorating a 
recognized misalignment in financial incentives in servicing contracts (see Cordell et al. 
(2008)).  The program also increases the value of modifications to investors with the addition 
of subsidies to mortgage investors. 
The program includes outreach and solicitation requirements to ensure fair and consistent 
treatment of all borrowers and helps to establish industry best practices in an area where few 
rules existed.  Participating servicers must solicit all borrowers who become 60 or more days 
delinquent for a HAMP modification, and they are required to evaluate every eligible loan 
using the standardized modification terms and the standardized net present value (NPV) test.
4
  
The servicer is required to offer the homeowner a modification in cases where the proposed 
modification is NPV positive.
5
  
a. The HAMP Modification 
The HAMP modification is structured to achieve a first-lien mortgage-debt-service to income 
(hereafter “front-end DTI”) target of 31 percent.  For an otherwise eligible modification to 
qualify for HAMP subsidies, the borrower’s monthly payments of principal and interest on 
their first lien, taxes, insurance, and homeowner association (HOA) fees must not exceed 31 
percent of their gross monthly income. 
The standard HAMP modification achieves the 31 percent DTI target through a 
uniform sequence of three steps (hereafter referred to as the modification “waterfall”).  The 
waterfall consists of: (1) a rate reduction to as low as 2 percent; (2) if necessary, a term 
extension up to 40 years; and (3) as necessary, principal forbearance.  The rate reduction 
remains in place for the first 5 years of the program.  Following the fifth year, the borrower’s 
interest rate rises by one percentage point each year until it reaches the Freddie Mac Primary 
Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages that was in effect at 
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 In addition, the HAMP program can modify borrowers who servicers determine to be at risk of imminent risk 
of default even if they are current or only 30-day delinquent on their mortgage. 
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 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require modification if the NPV exceeds negative $5,000. 
 the time the modification was underwritten.
6
  Principal forbearance remains in place for the 
duration of the loan, taking the form of a zero-coupon balloon payment due at maturity or 
when the mortgage is paid off.  
b. HAMP Incentives 
HAMP directly subsidizes all parties involved in the modification.
7
  The owner of the 
modified mortgage receives one-half the amount necessary to bring the mortgage payment 
from 38 DTI (or the current DTI, if lower) to the target DTI of 31 percent for the first five 
years of the program.  Furthermore, the lien-holder will receive a $1500 payment for 
modifying current borrowers who are at imminent risk of default
8
 and may receive a home 
price decline protection payment.
9
 Servicers receive $1000 when a loan modification 
completes its trial plan, fulfills its documentation requirements, and becomes permanent; if 
the modification continues to perform, the servicer is eligible for an additional $1000 on each 
of the first three anniversaries of the modification as well as additional incentives for 
modifying imminent default borrowers.  Homeowners are eligible for up to five one-time 
payments toward principal reduction equal to $1000 each year if they make their payments 
on time.  
II.   Practical Considerations in NPV Model Development 
Policymakers understood that a framework for systematic, consistent evaluation of the cash 
flows associated with modifications was crucial for facilitating a broad modification 
program.  An NPV tool ensures a basic degree of consistency across servicers, provides 
protection for investors, and mitigates some moral hazard concerns.  As HAMP was 
designed, an inter-agency team was created to build the NPV tool.  This team – comprised of 
staff from the Department of Treasury, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Housing and 
Urban Development, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
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 Information on the PMMS rate can be found at www.freddiemac.com/pmms/. 
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 For non-GSE mortgages, subsidies are financed by Treasury using Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
funds.  The GSEs do not receive investor subsidies from TARP, and pay performance subsidies to borrowers 
from their own resources.  However, when GSEs apply the NPV test, they calculate the NPV using the standard 
model, in effect acting as if they received TARP subsidies for performing the modifications.  
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 Borrower must successfully complete trial payments. 
9
 Details of the home price protection payment are provided in section III. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – was charged with quickly developing and implementing a 
model.  The development team faced several challenges and constraints in designing the 
model, which shaped the final product in important ways. 
a. Rapid Processing and Integration with Servicer Operations 
The NPV team was tasked with being both as accurate as possible for the widest variety of 
mortgages and servicers and sufficiently simple so that the model could be integrated into 
servicer protocols.  It was critical that the model used only information that was being 
collected and documented to verify borrower eligibility and monthly payments or was 
otherwise readily available to servicers.  These constraints limited the ability to capture some 
elements that would ideally be included in a comprehensive view of default and prepayment 
probabilities.   
 
The default and prepayment probability models reflect these input constraints.  Both models 
use inputs from a short list of sources: first-lien balance and delinquency information readily 
available from servicers’ databases, income information collected from the borrower for the 
purpose of identifying the appropriate payment level, the first-lien loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, 
and the borrower’s and coborrower’s FICO scores10.  A more complete view of the loan’s 
history and viability – including information on second liens, other financial obligations, and 
original underwriting documentation – is not consistently available for all borrowers.  Credit 
information can often, but not always, yield some insight into other liens and financial 
obligations, but auditable algorithms would be required to standardize treatment of 
ambiguous lien information or optional monthly payments (e.g. payments on credit card 
debts).  Ultimately, the NPV team and HAMP program designers determined that the process 
changes were operationally burdensome in the context of the program, and that these 
additional information requirements introduced documentation and validation risks that 
would differentially impact borrowers based on the composition of their mortgage and non-
mortgage debt. 
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 The first-lien LTV, updated for any changes to the principal balance of the mortgage or estimated value of the 
house, will be referred to as mark-to-market LTV (MTMLTV) to distinguish it from origination LTV.   
  b.  Limited Relevant Historical Data 
 
The NPV development team had little direct information or experience from which to 
parameterize the components of the NPV model.  Historical mortgage industry data is of 
limited use in calibrating default and prepayment behavior generated by HAMP 
modifications, both because the HAMP modification is structurally different from 
modifications that preceded the program and because loan-level datasets are not sufficiently 
seasoned to capture historical periods with high default rates or widespread negative equity 
for the types of mortgages that were predominant among seriously delinquent loans.  There 
was scant experience with modifications that resulted in substantial payment reductions.  
Prior to HAMP, most large servicers and the GSEs relied on capitalization of arrearages and 
short-term forbearance, neither of which resulted in meaningful payment reductions, as their 
primary approach for dealing with seriously delinquent loans (OCC 2009).  These loss-
mitigation strategies were adequate to deal with delinquency stemming from brief periods of 
income interruption, but generally servicers did not have adequate tools for handling long-
term affordability problems or serious negative equity.
11
  
The NPV team used performance data from a variety of sources to set key parameters such as 
default responsiveness to MTMLTV, FICO, and pre- and post-modification DTI.  The most 
difficult and critical task was to determine the change in default probabilities generated by 
changes in DTI.  This was an analytically challenging problem in part because loan level 
datasets do not include updated income information and because of measurement issues with 
this variable.   
III. Conceptual Framework of the Net Present Value (NPV) Model 
The role of the HAMP NPV model is to assess whether or not a loan modification (and 
associated subsidy payments) will be beneficial from the investor's perspective.
12
 A 
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automated loan modification tools.  Swagel (2009) describes post-financial crisis, pre-HAMP mortgage 
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 For an academic study of the trade-offs in modification see Ambrose and Capone (1996) 
 modification is 'NPV positive' when the total discounted value of expected cash flows for the 
modified loan is higher than those for the unmodified loan.  This section lays out the 
framework and key concepts of the NPV model currently in use (NPV Version 4.0).  A full 
discussion of the parameterization of the model and the data used for model calibration is 
available on the program’s administrative website13.   
The HAMP NPV model uses a simple framework to evaluate four static paths: the modified 
loan cures, the modified loan redefaults, the unmodified loan cures, and the unmodified loan 
proceeds through the foreclosure process. For ease of communication these paths will be 
referred to as "Mod Cure," "Mod Default," "No Mod Cure" and "No Mod Default."  The 
present value of cash-flows in each of the two paths associated with the modified loan (mod 
cure, mod default) are weighted by the path probabilities to obtain a present value of the 
modified loan.  The present values of the two paths associated with the non-modified loan are 
similarly weighed.  The Net Present Value is the difference between the probability-weighted 
cash flows in the mod and no-mod scenarios.  Figure 1 illustrates this simple framework.  
 
Figure 1:  Structure of NPV Model  
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 http://www.hmpadmin.com, in the “servicer documents” section of the website 
 The next section evaluates each of the separate components of the model: the discount rate, 
the default model, the prepayment model, cure cash flows (branches 1 and 3 of Figure 1), and 
default cash flows (branches 2 and 4). 
a. The Discount Rate 
Discounting is performed at a rate appropriate for mortgage cash flows.  The baseline 
discount rate is the Freddie Mac PMMS weekly rate for 30-year fixed-rate conforming loans. 
Servicers can override the baseline discount rate for private-label loans or loans in their 
portfolio by adding a risk premium of no more than 250 basis points to the PMMS weekly 
rate.  
b. The Default Model 
The default model is based on a logistic regression framework, and is therefore nonlinear in 
its inputs.  The variables determining default probability are the MTMLTV of the first-lien 
mortgage, the borrower’s current credit score, the borrower’s DTI before the modification, 
and the delinquency status of the loan.
14
  An additional term reflects the payment relief 
generated by the reduction in DTI: in the “no-mod” case it is set to zero and in the “mod” 
case it is the percentage change in DTI granted by the modification.  
For the standard HAMP modification, which changes the borrower’s monthly payment but 
does not change the principal balance, the difference between the default probabilities in the 
mod and no-mod scenarios is generated entirely by the change in the borrower’s DTI.  Where 
principal write down is used, the modification reduces both the MTMLTV of the loan and the 
borrower’s DTI.  In this case, the reduction in the default probability reflects both a lowered 
LTV ratio and a reduced mortgage payment. 
Consistent with intuition, predicted default rates increase with MTMLTV and starting DTI 
and decrease with FICO scores.  The model specifies a linear spline in the MTMLTV levels 
which allows kinks in the slope of the MTMLTV curve at the knot points located at 100 and 
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 DTI refers to the front-end ratio. Front-end DTI is the ratio of principal, interest, taxes, insurance (including 
homeowners’ insurance and hazard and flood insurance), and homeowners’ association and/or condominium 
fees (PITIA) to gross monthly income. Private mortgage insurance is excluded from the PITIA calculation.   
 120 LTV.
15
  The benefit of the spline is that it allows a better representation of the default 
behavior for high LTV loans. 
Predicted redefault rates are generally decreasing with starting DTI but can increase at very 
high DTI levels.  An increase in starting DTI increases the borrower’s risk of default, but the 
borrower also receives a greater reduction in monthly payments, which reduces the chance of 
redefault.  Over low DTI ranges, the stabilizing feature of the payment reduction outweighs 
the influence of the starting DTI, and redefault probability declines in DTI.  At very high 
starting DTI levels, the redefault probability suggested by the high initial DTI outweighs the 
stabilizing influence of the payment reduction, and overall redefault probability increases.  
The model coefficients are calibrated to observed default rates for a broad loan population 
using data selected from HAMP modifications, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seasoned loans, 
ABS/MBS data from First American CoreLogic, and other data   It is not a purely empirical 
specification as there are very limited data on modifications with HAMP-like contract terms. 
As the mortgage market gains experience with relevant modifications, the model will be 
increasingly empirically grounded. 
c. The Prepayment Model 
In contrast to the default model, which allocates default probabilities to a single point in time, 
the prepayment model calculates a prepayment probability for each month of the loan’s 
scheduled amortization period. The model is estimated using a logistic regression model on a 
sample of GSE delinquent loans.  The model is identical for loans in the mod and no-mod 
scenarios, though the inputs reflect the characteristics of the loan along each path. The key 
inputs of the model include delinquency level, refinancing incentive (effective spread to the 
PMMS rate), MTMLTV, previous 12-months’ house price growth rate, current FICO, and 
the original loan amount.  Separate models are estimated for each loan delinquency status. 
d. Cash Flows in Default (Figure 1: Branches 2 and 4) 
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 Operationally, a linear spline with knot point, k, adds a variable into the regression of the form: 
max[0,MTMLTV – k]. 
 The model utilizes a simplified approach to the timing of default. In the non-modification 
scenario (branch 4), the model assumes that if the loan defaults, it defaults immediately and 
makes no further payments. In the modification scenario (branch 2), the model assumes that 
the loan defaults 6 months after beginning the modified loan payments.  The immediate 
default in the no-mod scenario reflects the fact that loans entering the program are generally 
either already quite delinquent or deemed by the servicer to be severely distressed and in 
imminent default.  The 6-month timeline for redefault in the mod scenario reflects the 
observed median time to redefault, conditional on eventually defaulting. 
Once the loan defaults, it is assumed to proceed to foreclosure according to state-level 
foreclosure  timelines, adjusting for the number of months the loan is delinquent  at the time 
of evaluation for HAMP.
16
  
In default the cash flow consists of proceeds minus costs: the REO net property disposition 
value  minus taxes, insurance, and homeowners' association fees.  All disposition-related 
cash flows are assumed to occur on the date of REO sale. These include state-varying 
foreclosure costs and REO disposition costs, mortgage insurance  proceeds, and state-varying 
net REO sales proceeds (estimated using the current property value and a state-varying REO 
discount).  Thus the present value of the cash flows in the case of a loan default is: 
   
 
where: C is taxes and insurance and homeowners’ association fees, δ is the monthly discount 
rate; S the time until REO sale, and NPDV is the net property disposition value
17
.  The 
determination of the NPDV effectively embeds a simple severity model into the cash-flow 
structure. 
For the modified loan along the default path, the cash flows also include incentive payments 
paid by the government to the investor during the 6-month period that the loan performs.   
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  The foreclosure timelines are derived from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae foreclosure data. 
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 NPDV includes all other costs advanced by the servicer and borne by the investor. For simplicity, the timing 
of such payments occur at REO disposition. 
  
e. Cure Cash Flows (Figure 1: Branches 1 and 3) 
The mod and no-mod cure scenarios are evaluated using the same basic framework.  Each 
month, the cash flows are estimated to be: (1) the scheduled principal and interest payment, 
weighted by the probability the loan will not prepay in that period and (2) the remaining 
unpaid principal balance (UPB) of the loan, weighted by the probability that the loan will 
prepay in that month. 
Hence, the basic framework for both branches 1 and 3 in Figure 1 is: 
 
where: MDLQ = Months delinquent, T = Remaining term, δ = Monthly discount rate, UPB = 
Unpaid principal balance, P = Principal , I = Interest, and SMMk = Single month mortality 
(for prepayment) in month k.   
Unmodified loans that cure (branch 3) may have an arrearage that also must be accounted 
for. Here we make the simplifying assumption that the principal and interest arrearage is paid 
immediately which is reflected in the MDLQ (P0 + I0) term in the present value formula.  For 
the Mod scenario (branch 1), the cash flows reflect the three types of incentives paid to the 
investor and the cash-flow implications of the borrower incentives.  These incentives offset 
some of the reduction in cash flows resulting from the modified loan terms.  Servicer 
incentives are not included in the investor’s cash-flows and have no direct impact on the 
NPV model. The incentives included in the cash-flows are: 
(1) Payment Reduction Cost Share:  50% of the cost of lowering monthly payments from 
a level consistent with a 38% DTI to that consistent with the target DTI of 31%, for 
up to five years. For example, a borrower with an income of $1,000 per month and a 
housing payment (first lien mortgage, taxes, insurance, HOA dues) of $400 per month 
would start with a front-end DTI of 40%.  The investor would first reduce the 
mortgage payment by $20 per month to get the DTI to 38%, then reduce the payment 
 again by $70 per month to get the DTI to 31%, and Treasury would compensate the 
investor for half of the $70, or $35 per month. 
(2)  Imminent Default Modification Incentive: If the borrower is current at the beginning 
of the trial period (i.e., determined by the servicer to be in imminent default) and 
current at the end of the trial period, the investor will be paid $1,500 by the HAMP.  
(3) Borrower Pay-for-Performance Incentive: Borrowers who make timely monthly 
payments are eligible to accrue up to $1,000 of reduction in principal each year for 
five years.  These payments are advanced immediately to the investor as principal 
curtailment.  Because these payments are credited to the borrower through reduced 
principal, they alter the loan to value ratio and therefore have an impact on 
prepayment and loss severities.
18
 
(4) Home Price Decline Protection Incentive (HPDP):  HPDP is an investor incentive to 
offset some of the investors’ risk of loss exposure due to near-term negative 
momentum in the local market home prices.  The HPDP incentive payments are 
calculated based upon the following three characteristics of the mortgage loan 
receiving a HAMP modification:  
(i)  An estimate of the cumulative projected home price decline over the next year, as 
measured by changes in the home price index over the previous two quarters in the 
applicable local market (MSA or non-MSA region) in which the related mortgaged 
property is located;  
(ii)  The UPB of the mortgage loan prior to modification under HAMP; and  
(iii)  The MTMLTV of the mortgage loan based on the UPB of the mortgage loan 
prior to modification under HAMP.  
IV. NPV Performance 
                                                 
18
 The pay-for-performance incentives are not reflected in the default model because, as noted, modification 
redefault is assumed to occur six-months after modification, prior to the accrual of any pay-for performance 
incentives. 
 The NPV model compares the expected cash flows of a loan and its corresponding HAMP 
modification.  For a modification to generate an NPV positive result, the cost of the 
modification – the reduction in the expected value of scheduled mortgage payments relative 
to the unmodified loan terms, adjusted for prepayment timing and government subsidies – 
must be recovered by an increase in the probability of avoiding a costly foreclosure.  Grossly 
oversimplified, the reduction in the default probability caused by the modification, times the 
expected loss if there is a default, must exceed the cost (net of government subsidies) of 
providing the modification.  As section III described in depth, the NPV model consists of 
three separate, interacting models: the default probability model, the prepay probability 
model, and the discounted cash-flow model.  This section briefly discusses the intuition and 
key concepts in each of the separate models and follows with some illustrative comparative 
statics exercises. 
a. NPV Performance General Discussion: Key Concepts  
Default Model – Key Concepts 
It is important to emphasize that value within the NPV model is primarily generated by the 
change in the default probability resulting from the modification rather than the level of the 
default probability of the modified loan.  Holding constant the change in cash flows, a 
modification that reduces the default probability by 30 percentage points, from 90 percent to 
60 percent, generates more value than a modification that lowers the default probability by 5 
percent, from 20 percent to 15 percent, though the latter modification has a much lower 
default probability.  An NPV-improving modification might have high-expected re-default 
rates; therefore a high default probability does not indicate that the investor is made worse 
through modification.
19
 
Prepayment Model – Key Concepts 
The prepayment model dictates when the borrower will voluntarily prepay the remaining 
principal balance of the loan. The value of receiving that money at a given time – relative to 
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 The initial level of default probability influences the modification value indirectly, in that it determines the 
extent to which a payment reduction translates into a reduction in default probability in the logistic specification.  
 receiving the amortizing payments – depends on the coupon rate of the loan relative to the 
investor’s discount rate.  Increasing the rate of prepayment lowers the value of a loan with a 
coupon higher than the discount rate (because it shortens the time a premium over the market 
rate is earned) and increases the value of a loan with a coupon lower than the discount rate 
(because it allows the released funds to be reinvested at a higher interest rate).  
Discounted Cash Flow Model – Key Concepts 
The cash flow model in the case where the loan performs is a straightforward amortization of 
the loan according to the terms.  However, the default branches of the cash flows – in both 
the mod and no-mod scenarios – introduce regional variation in foreclosure costs with 
impacts worth discussing. 
The NPV model includes state-level REO sales discounts and foreclosure timelines because 
(1) the legal fees and administrative costs associated with foreclosing on a property, (2) the 
length of time to complete a foreclosure transaction, and (3) the amount below the estimated 
home value a foreclosed property is likely to receive in an REO sale are all expected to vary 
geographically, based on state foreclosure laws and other factors.  Combined with MSA-level 
home price projections, these parameters determine the value the investor receives upon 
foreclosure of the home, which forms a crucial threshold in the NPV model.  If the loan 
balance is below this amount – less a small cushion reflecting the government subsidies to 
the investor – the NPV test almost never delivers a positive result.  When the present value of 
the home in foreclosure less associated costs exceeds the remaining loan balance, an 
improvement in the default probability from the no-mod to the mod scenario is highly 
unlikely to recover the loss in cash flows to the investor from modification, and the 
modification is therefore almost always NPV negative. 
 
b. Key Variables and Comparative Statics – the Operation of the Model 
The NPV test is nonlinear in most of its inputs, which makes the influence of specific inputs 
difficult to directly characterize.  To provide some intuition for the behavior of the model 
under various conditions, we present both an analysis of the NPV accept decisions and a 
series of comparative static exercises.     
  
The analysis of NPV accept decisions is based on a sample of 69,625 loan submissions to the 
NPV model after October 1, 2010.
20 
 In this sample, 92.9% of the submissions passed the 
NPV test.  Loans are determined to pass the NPV test if the NPV value is greater than $0 or 
in the case of  Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae loans greater than negative $5000.  Table 1 shows 
the distribution of NPV test pass rates stratified by key variables and Table 2 shows the 
results of a logistic regression on NPV outcome using the same data.   
 
Not surprisingly given the different thresholds for an NPV pass, loans guaranteed by Freddie 
Mac or Fannie Mae pass at a higher rate than loans on portfolio or serviced on behalf of an 
investor (95.6% GSE/ 89.2% non-GSE) and the indicator variable for GSE loans has a 
positive and significant coefficient in the logistic regression results.  In the same vein, a 
higher discount rate applied to long-term cash flows tends to result in lower pass rates, 
because loan modifications extend the period over which cash flows are received.  The 
discount premium (which is applicable only to loans not guaranteed by Freddie Mac or 
Fannie Mae and allows the discount rate to be increased between 0 and 2.5%) and higher 
PMMS rates are associated with lower pass rates and have negative coefficients in the 
logistic regression. 
 
Characteristics associated with higher expected default rates are correlated with higher NPV 
pass rates.  Loans are at higher risk of default as they become more delinquent; loans 
classified as 90+ days delinquent pass at a higher rate than less delinquent loans.  Current and 
30-days delinquent loans are eligible for a HAMP modification only if they are determined to 
be at imminent risk of default.  In the NPV model, these loans are treated as though they are 
60-89 days delinquent in order to reflect the imminent default determination.
21
   
                                                 
20
 Servicers could access the NPV model either through coding the model into their systems or using the NPV 
transaction portal maintained by the US Treasury Department.  These data were taken from loans submitted to 
the portal and evaluated using the V4 NPV model.  The data was also subject to some reasonableness data edits 
and restricted to HAMP eligible loans.  
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 Perhaps surprisingly, the pass rate for imminent default loans is slightly higher than for loans that are 60-89 
days delinquent (91.1%  versus 88.8%) and this higher pass rate is also reflected in the logistic regression 
results.  This result reflects other characteristics of imminent default borrowers and the additional investor 
subsidies offered these loans. 
  
The MTMLTV parameter estimated in the logistic regression is positive – suggesting that in 
general a higher MTMLTV results in a higher probability of an NPV pass.  However, the 
relationship of MTMLTV to pass rates described in Table 1 is non-monotonic.  Lower FICO 
scores are associated with a higher probability of an NPV pass, but the degree to which this 
relationship holds varies with MTMLTV.   
 
Loans that require greater financial concessions tend to have lower pass rates.  This is most 
clearly seen in the principal forbearance results in Table 1 and Table 2.  Loans requiring 
great amounts of principal forbearance are less likely to be NPV positive.  Similarly, the 
logistic regression results indicate that loans with higher initial front-end DTI levels have a 
lower probability of  an NPV pass; however Table 1 shows that pass rates are not 
monotonically decreasing as DTI rises, which we explore in more detail in the comparative 
statics exercises.    
 
Some of the costs associated with default (including some of the foreclosure and disposition 
costs) are large and fixed, and so investor losses in foreclosure as a percentage of UPB tend 
to be larger for lower UPB homes.  Similarly, as a proportion of UPB both the investor 
incentives for imminent default loans and the borrower incentives will be larger for lower 
UPB homes.  This motivates why lower loan balance loans (UPB Before Mod) are associated 
with higher pass rates 
 Table 1. NPV Pass Rates by Loan Attribute
Count Percent Count Percent
GSE Flag
Non-GSE 26,732 89.2% 29,954 43.0%
GSE 37,927 95.6% 39,671 57.0%
Imminent Default Flag
Imminent Default 11,253 91.1% 12,350 17.7%
60-89 days past due 6,167 88.8% 6,948 10.0%
90+ days past due 47,239 93.9% 50,327 72.3%
Front-end DTI
≤ 0.35 11,543 96.4% 11,979 17.2%
(0.35,0.38] 9,204 98.0% 9,396 13.5%
(0.38,0.41] 8,249 96.1% 8,586 12.3%
(0.41,0.45] 9,273 94.8% 9,784 14.1%
(0.45,0.50] 9,059 93.0% 9,737 14.0%
(0.50,0.55] 6,364 91.7% 6,940 10.0%
> 0.55 10,967 83.1% 13,203 19.0%
Mark-to-market LTV
≤ .60 3,684 80.3% 4,585 6.6%
(.60,.80] 6,292 81.2% 7,745 11.1%
(.80,1.00] 13,227 92.2% 14,339 20.6%
(1.00,1.20] 14,553 96.5% 15,078 21.7%
(1.20,1.40] 9,962 96.4% 10,333 14.8%
(1.40,1.60] 6,224 97.2% 6,402 9.2%
(1.60,1.80] 3,933 96.5% 4,074 5.9%
(1.80,2.00] 2,551 96.6% 2,642 3.8%
> 2.00 4,233 95.6% 4,427 6.4%
FICO
≤ 540 22,997 93.4% 24,623 35.4%
(540, 600] 19,708 93.3% 21,122 30.3%
(600,675] 13,956 92.6% 15,068 21.6%
> 675 7,998 90.8% 8,812 12.7%
UPB Before Mod
≤ 100,000 9,937 94.6% 10,505 15.1%
(100,000, 200,000] 24,792 94.2% 26,307 37.8%
(200,000, 300,000] 16,007 93.6% 17,103 24.6%
> 300,000 13,923 88.6% 15,710 22.6%
Principal Forbearance Amount
0 45,653 95.7% 47,682 68.5%
≤ 100,000 14,970 91.4% 16,374 23.5%
> 100,000 4,036 72.5% 5,569 8.0%
Freddie PMMS Rate
<= .0425 10,076 94.0% 10,722 15.4%
(.0425,.045] 7,804 93.5% 8,343 12.0%
(.045,.0457] 12,162 93.0% 13,071 18.8%
(.0475,.05] 32,329 92.3% 35,012 50.3%
 > .05 2,288 92.4% 2,477 3.6%
Discount Rate Premium
0 62,652 93.5% 66,997 96.2%
(0,.025) 534 86.6% 616 0.9%
0.025 1,473 73.3% 2,012 2.9%
All 64,659 92.9% 69,625 100
NPV Pass       
(>=-5k for GSE) Total
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression: NPV Pass 
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variable Estimate
Intercept 6.3167 ***
(0.3466)
GSE Flag 0.7629 ***
(0.0370)
Delinquency Status
Imminent Default -0.1741 ***
(0.0305)
60-89 days past due -0.441 ***
(0.0318)
90+ days past due 0 ***
Front-end DTI -0.0399 ***
(0.0014)
Mark-to-market LTV 0.0295 ***
(0.0006)
FICO -0.00115
***
(0.0002)
UPB Before Mod ($K) -0.00166 ***
(0.0001)
Principal Forbearance Amount ($k) -0.00857 ***
(0.0003)
Freddie PMMS Rate (bps) -0.848911 ***
(0.0677)
Discount Rate Premium (bps) -0.775715 ***
(0.0260)
Note:*** denotes coefficients that are statistically significant at a >99 percent confidence level.  
  
 
Further insight into the working of the NPV model can be obtained by illustrating the change 
in NPV values in response to changes in loan and borrower characteristics in specific 
examples.  For these examples, we use a hypothetical loan that is NPV positive (NPV of 
HAMP modification = $19,664).
 
  This baseline loan is described in Table 3. The loan is an 
underwater (MTMLTV = 120) fixed-rate mortgage, originated in 2008 in the Miami area.  
The HAMP modification for this loan includes a temporary reduction in the note rate to 2 
percent, a term extension to 480 months, and forbearance of $24,840.  The new re-payment 
terms reduce the borrower’s DTI from 50 to 31 and payment from $1,274 to $592. 
 
Table 3:  Attributes of Baseline Loan
 - Loan Type: 30yr Fixed Rate  - Origination Year: 2008
 - Current Note Rate: 6.5%  - Current FICO: 550
 - Current Income: $3,600  - Delinquency Level: 11 Months
 - MSA: Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach  - MTMLTV: 120%
 - Pre-Mod Payment: $1,274  - Post-Mod Payment: $592
 - Taxes/Insurance/HOA: $524  - Pre-Mod DTI: 50%  
 
We illustrate the NPV impact of changes to key variables, holding other variables constant. 
The extent to which the illustrated changes in the dollar value of the NPV test translate into 
NPV acceptances or rejections in the HAMP program depends upon the composition of loans 
evaluated for modification. Theoretically, for every dollar change illustrated, a loan exists 
that may be converted from NPV positive to negative.  To reinforce this logical framework, 
we illustrate the NPV-impacts of changing individual variables in terms of the resulting 
changes in NPV relative to the baseline loan. The present value cash flows of the unmodified 
and modified loans and the net present value are set to zero for the baseline loan. The values 
associated with all other loan characteristics are represented as differences from the baseline 
values, scaled by the unpaid balance of the loan. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mark-to-market LTV 
As discussed above, MTMLTV is an important variable in determining NPV outcomes.  
MTMLTV is a critical input to the prepayment and default models, reducing likelihood of 
prepayment and increasing likelihood of default.  The MTMLTV is also critical to 
determining losses that the note-holder will incur in the event of foreclosure (essentially 
whether the value of the home is sufficient to pay off the first-lien unpaid balance and 
foreclosure costs).  Figure 2 shows the impact on the baseline loan’s NPV results when this 
loan’s MTMLTV is changed, all other things equal.  The illustrated change in MTMLTV 
reflects adjustments to the value of the home, so that the terms of the modification are not 
affected.  For LTV ranges between 80 and around 150 the NPV of the loan increases with 
MTMLTV.  The intuition of this result is that the cost of the modification is sufficiently high 
in terms of foregone income that it is profitable only when the modification sufficiently 
reduces the probability that the investor will face very substantial principal losses. When 
negative equity becomes extreme, the NPV can begin falling, because the redefault 
probability becomes extremely high.  In the case of this hypothetical loan, NPV relative to 
the baseline loan falls beyond 150 MTMLTV. 
Figure 2: NPV and Cash Flows Relative to Baseline:     
By MTMLTV
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Figure 3 illustrates the role of the MTMLTV in the probability of default and redefault.
 
Both 
the no-modification default and the modification redefault probabilities rise over the entire 
range shown.  In this borrower’s case, the spread between the no modification default and the 
modification redefault narrows over the entire range of MTMLTVs. In other cases, the 
spread increases over lower ranges of MTMLTV and then begins to decrease at higher 
MTMLTVs.  The general result is that the narrowing of the spread in default probabilities as 
MTMLTV becomes extreme accounts for the potential for a decline in the NPV values for 
high MTMLTV levels.  
Figure 3: Default Probabilities: By MTMLTV
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 FICO 
The impact of the borrower’s credit score or FICO on her NPV outcome depends heavily on 
the borrower’s equity position.  To illustrate, Figure 4 compares NPV outcomes for the 
hypothetical loan (as a percentage of pre-modification UPB) across a wide range of FICO 
scores with three alternative MTMLTV scenarios. For borrowers with positive equity, NPV 
results are largely insensitive to FICO scores.  As shown in figure 4, NPV remains mostly 
flat until around 700 and thereafter improves slightly.  This is, in part, because FICO effects 
 the NPV calculation only through the default and prepayment models. For borrowers with 
significant equity, losses are expected to be low and differences in default probabilities do 
not translate into large changes in NPV. 
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Figure 4: NPV relative to baseline: By FICO and MTMLTV
 
For a borrower with negative equity (MTMLTV = 120 and MTMLTV =180) the NPV is 
generally increasing with respect to FICO.  The increase in NPV over the FICO ranges is 
partly driven by an increasing spread between the mod and no-mod default probabilities over 
that range.    Figure 5 plots the difference between the no modification–modification default 
probability spread at the base FICO score (550) and each other FICO point for three 
MTMLTV scenarios (80, 120, and 180).   
Figure 5 illustrates the increasing difference in the spread between the no modification and 
modification default probabilities as FICO rises.  This increasing differential causes the NPV 
to increase as FICO rises, reflecting the higher probability of a successful (non-redefaulting 
modification).  Figure 5 also shows that this effect is magnified when the borrower is in a 
negative equity position, but is not monotonically increasing with MTMLTV.  The impact of 
FICO on the spread between no modification and modification default probabilities is quite 
different across MTMLTV categories.  Between FICO=450 and 850, the spread between the 
 no-modification and modification default probabilities increases by 8.6 percentage points for 
a MTMLTV=80 loan, compared to 13.5 and 10.6 percentage points respectively for 
MTLTV=120 and 180 loans.  This illustrates why the NPV improvement across the FICO 
spectrum in the MTMLTV= 80 scenario is much smaller than for the MTMLTV 100 and 120 
scenarios in Figure 4.  The fact that the increase in the spread between the no-modification 
and modification default probabilities is less pronounced at MTMLTV = 180 than it is at 
MTMLTV = 120 reflects the fact that at very high MTMLTV levels improvements in default 
rates are less pronounced because very high MTMLTV borrowers are generally very likely to 
default. 
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Figure 5: Default Probability Spread Relative to Baseline: 
By MTMLTV and FICO
 
 Front-end Debt-to-Income Ratio 
The original front-end DTI ratio of the borrower determines the monthly payment reduction 
required to achieve the requisite 31 percent.  Initial DTIs much greater than 31 percent 
require large payment reductions, and are therefore expensive modifications relative to initial 
DTIs close to the target.  NPV generally declines with DTI above 38 percent, but in many 
circumstances NPV is flat or increasing at lower levels of DTI.  This interesting result is 
driven by the dual role DTI plays in the model.  Front-end DTI impacts the borrower’s 
 default probability in both the modification and the no-modification scenarios.  Borrowers 
with high front-end DTIs have high-predicted default rates, but a high DTI also allows for 
substantial stabilization through the large payment reduction required to achieve the target 
DTI.  The increased expense of modification for high-DTI borrowers can therefore be 
counteracted by a substantial decline in the predicted probability of redefault.  Conversely, a 
borrower with a starting DTI close to 31 will receive a small payment reduction that will not 
sufficiently impact the redefault rate and hence, the result will be a negative NPV. Figures 6 
and 7 illustrate. 
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Figure 6: NPV and Cash Flows Relative to Baseline: By DTI
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Figure 7: Default Probabilities: By DTI 
 
 
 Geographical Variants 
The state-level variation in the REO discount values, foreclosure costs, and foreclosure 
timelines, along with the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level variation in home price 
expectations – partially mitigated by home price decline protection (HPDP) payments – 
generate significant regional variation in NPV outcomes.  Figure 8 shows the NPV for the 
hypothetical loan in different MSAs.  Table 4, provides a decomposition on the components 
that drive the regional variation relative to the Miami area.  A number of results stand out.  
Areas with less negative home price trajectories are more likely to receive modifications 
because the cost of a delayed foreclosure in the case of redefault is higher in areas with larger 
projected home price declines.  The Home Price Decline Protection Incentive serves to 
ameliorate the impact of home price forecasts on NPV outcomes and encourage more NPV 
positive modifications in areas with large projected home price declines. 
Higher REO discount values and foreclosure costs and longer foreclosure timelines have a 
dramatic positive impact on the NPV of modification, because each makes the foreclosure 
 more costly.  For example, if the hypothetical base loan were located in California rather than 
in Florida, the shorter foreclosure timelines associated with the California market would 
reduce the NPV of modification by 1.13 percent of pre-modification UPB.  The impact of the 
REO discount (or “stigma”) is even more dramatic. 
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Figure 8: Regional Variation in NPV Relative to Baseline: 
By MSA
 
 
  
Las Vegas-
Paradise, NV
Santa Barbara-
Santa Maria-
Goleta, CA
Los Angeles-
Long Beach-
Santa Ana, CA
Birmingham-
Hoover, AL
Baltimore-
Towson, MD Toledo, OH
Regional Variables
Projected Home Price Indices only -0.58% -0.55% -0.10% -0.44% -0.41% -0.98%
Foreclosure & REO Disposition Timelines & Costs only -0.40% -1.09% -1.09% 0.27% -0.48% 2.10%
REO Sale Value Parameters only -2.85% -1.40% -1.40% 1.64% 3.00% 2.62%
Home Price Decline Protection Incentive only 0.08% 0.10% 0.00% 0.13% 0.05% 0.62%
All Corresponding Regional Data Intact -4.99% -3.46% -2.71% 0.92% 2.35% 4.35%
Table 4:  Effect of Regional Variables on NPV by MSA (Base MSA: Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL)
Percent of UPB Before Mod
 
 
  
c. Redefault Model Assessment 
 
For an early assessment of the performance of the redefault model, we used a dataset 
constructed from HAMP administrative records consisting of 361,577 permanent HAMP 
modifications.  These records included all modifications made permanent between 
August 2009 and July 2010 for which all inputs to the default model were available.  Of 
these, 20,469 were 90 or more days delinquent six months after becoming a permanent 
modification, implying about a 5.7% redefault rate in 6 months
22
.  We used this subset of 
HAMP loans to evaluate the performance of the default model to date.   
Table 5 shows the distribution of loans across relevant characteristics, including initial 
front-end DTI, vintage, their back-end DTI, MTMLTV, FICO, months past due, and the 
payment change. Disqualification rates (indicating 90+ days delinquency) are also shown 
by loan characteristic. Note that some fields used in the regression such as the FICO 
score, were not required at the inception of the program and hence early modifications 
may be disproportionately excluded from this sample. 
                                                 
22
 This rate is not directly comparable to HAMP redefault rates published in the OCC and OTS Mortgage 
Metrics Report.  The OCC/OTS report uses a 60 day delinquency rate when reporting on HAMP 
performance.  Furthermore the report only reflects modifications from OCC and OTS regulated institutions.  
 Table 5. Distribution of Sample Population
Loan Count
Share of 
Sample 
Population
Share 
Disqualified 
at 6-months 
(90+ days 
delinquent)
Front-end DTI
≤ 0.35 44,378 12.3% 10.7%
(0.35,0.38] 43,247 12.0% 8.5%
(0.38,0.41] 43,541 12.0% 7.1%
(0.41,0.45] 53,493 14.8% 5.7%
(0.45,0.50] 55,458 15.3% 4.5%
(0.50,0.55] 41,133 11.4% 3.7%
(0.55,0.60] 28,025 7.8% 3.2%
(0.60,0.65] 18,675 5.2% 2.6%
> 0.65 33,627 9.3% 1.7%
Modification Vintage
2009:Q3 197 0.1% 15.2%
2009:Q4 21,333 5.9% 4.5%
2010:Q1 141,045 39.0% 4.9%
2010:Q2 161,545 44.7% 6.4%
2010:Q3 37,457 10.4% 6.1%
Back-end DTI
≤ 0.40 77,404 21.4% 6.6%
(0.40,0.50] 45,805 12.7% 6.6%
(0.50,0.60] 36,438 10.1% 6.0%
(0.60,0.70] 37,153 10.3% 6.1%
(0.70,1.00] 102,020 28.2% 5.3%
≥ 1.00 62,757 17.4% 4.0%
Mark-to-market LTV
≤ 1.00 106,802 29.5% 4.9%
(1.00,1.20] 78,153 21.6% 5.7%
(1.20,1.40] 57,630 15.9% 5.6%
(1.40,1.60] 39,323 10.9% 5.7%
(1.60,1.80] 25,915 7.2% 6.0%
(1.80,2.00] 16,836 4.7% 6.1%
> 2.00 36,918 10.2% 7.2%
FICO
≤ 540 139,874 38.7% 8.5%
(540, 600] 97,225 26.9% 5.5%
(600,675] 71,404 19.8% 3.2%
> 675 53,074 14.7% 1.9%
Days delinquent
< 60 94,509 26.1% 3.2%
≥ 60 267,068 73.9% 6.5%
Payment Change
≥ -10% 27,750 7.7% 11.4%
[-20%, -10%) 44,322 12.3% 8.9%
[-30%, -20%) 56,291 15.6% 7.3%
< -30% 233,214 64.5% 4.0%
All 361,577 100.0% 5.7%  
 Table 6 shows the results of a logistic regression of an indicator variable for modification 
disqualification (indicating 90+ day delinquency) on the covariates used in the NPV 
default model.  We have also included an additional control for the vintage of the loan. 
 Table 6: Logistic Regression: 90+ Delinquency 6 months post-modification
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variable Estimate
Intercept -4.5487
***
(0.0596)
Front-end DTI
<= 0.35 2.0066 ***
(0.0449)
(0.35,0.38] 1.7499
***
(0.0456)
(0.38,0.41] 1.551
***
(0.0461)
(0.41,0.45] 1.3061
***
(0.0461)
(0.45,0.50] 1.0363 ***
(0.0468)
(0.50,0.55] 0.8084
***
(0.0496)
(0.55,0.60] 0.6391
***
(0.0542)
(0.60,0.65] 0.4254 ***
(0.0624)
>0.65 0
Mark-to-market LTV
<=1.00 -0.5976
***
(0.0252)
(1.00-1.20] -0.3615 ***
(0.0259)
(1.20-1.40] -0.3164 ***
(0.0276)
(1.40-1.60] -0.2592 ***
(0.0301)
(1.60-1.80] -0.1863 ***
(0.0336)
(1.80-2.00] -0.1629 ***
(0.0386)
>2.0 0
FICO
<=540 1.3763 ***
(0.0344)
(540, 600] 0.9517 ***
(0.0358)
(600,675] 0.4637 ***
(0.0389)
>675 0
Modification Vintage
2009:Q3 0.867 ***
(0.2050)
2009:Q4 -0.3445 ***
(0.0399)
2010:Q1 -0.253 ***
(0.0253)
2010:Q2 0.0234
(0.0243)
2010:Q3 0
Days Delinquent
<60 -0.5128 ***
(0.0208)
>=60 0
Note:*** denotes coefficients that are statistically significant at a >99 
percent confidence level.   
 At this early stage, the initial performance of modified loans can provide some insight 
into whether the predicted relationships between the variables are qualitatively consistent 
with the observed drivers of redefault in the HAMP program.  The results are mostly 
monotonic and directionally consistent with the NPV redefault model, providing support 
for the underlying default specification.  Figure 3 above shows an increasing probability 
of default (after modification) as MTMLTV increases; this relationship is evident in the 
results.  All else equal, we see a pattern of higher default probability in higher MTMLTV 
ranges.  Similarly, as described in Figure 5, high FICOs result in lower redefault 
probabilities.  The effect of delinquency status at time of modification shows the same 
basic structure as the redefault model: borrowers who have never been delinquent or 
came into the program just after becoming delinquent have a lower chance of 
redefaulting than borrowers who are two or more periods delinquent when they entered 
the program.   
 
The one area where qualitative results suggest a meaningful difference between the 
empirical results and the structure of the redefault model is front-end DTI.  Because all 
HAMP mods produce a DTI of 31%, the change in DTI is completely determined by the 
pre-mod DTI.  As discussed above, the NPV redefault model is non-linear in front-end 
DTI (Figure 7) with redefault increasing at high pre-mod DTI levels.  Instead, the early 
empirical evidence reported in Table 6 shows a monotonic relationship suggesting that 
the change in DTI dominates the starting level of DTI as a driver of default.  As 
modifications continue to age this relationship will become clearer and the structure of 
the redefault models may be modified to reflect this. 
 
It also should be emphasized the early program data will not reveal whether the redefault 
model is accurately predicting the level of redefault probability.  The redefault model in 
the NPV tool assigns a predicted lifetime redefault probability, whereas the data currently 
available for evaluation consist of only the first several months after a modification 
successfully completes its trial and is made permanent.  Moreover, because HAMP trials 
can be cancelled for reasons other than nonpayment, we can be sure a HAMP 
cancellation is due to nonpayment only after the modification has completed the trial 
 payments, seasoning for at least 3 months.  Finally, the limited seasoning of this sample 
precludes capturing the impacts of mortgage rate step-ups after the 5-year initial mod 
period. The predicted default levels are therefore not expected to align with the observed 
redefault rate at this point. 
 
V.  Concluding Thoughts: Limitations of the Model and Challenges for the Future 
The HAMP NPV model was developed in recognition of the critical need for a 
standardized, defensible and timely mechanism for evaluating the net benefit of a loan 
modification.  Given the many different loan types and stakeholders, a single set of 
default, prepay, and cash-flow assumptions cannot perfectly capture the true NPV for 
each mortgage investor.  However, aside from these inherent limitations, the existing 
model has some simplifications and shortcomings that are critical to understanding what 
the model does and does not accomplish.  They also form an agenda for future model 
enhancements that can be divided into three categories: improving existing behavioral 
assumptions, adding additional variables and introducing additional richness in model 
inputs.  
 
Improving Behavioral Assumptions 
 
The assumptions behind the default probability model and the prepayment model are 
likely to be the largest major source of change in model performance going forward.  As 
shown in Section V, the early performance of HAMP modifications is directionally 
consistent with the assumptions in the NPV default model.  As part of the development 
process, the parameters of the default model have been tested against the performance of 
more mature IndyMac modifications and found reasonable.
23
  Nevertheless, the model 
remains far from a pure empirical specification and several information-rich datasets are 
emerging that will inform these assumptions.     
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 Prior to HAMP, the FDIC systematically modified troubled mortgages in the IndyMac Federal Bank 
portfolio or serviced by IndyMac using modification terms similar to those adopted in HAMP.  The FDIC 
program targeted sustainable payments at a 38 percent DTI (later adjusted to 31 DTI) and followed a 
standard waterfall process that required first reducing the interest rate to as low as 3 percent and then as 
required to hit the target DTI, extending the amortization term up to 40 years and forbearing principal.  
  
Additional Variables 
 
A comprehensive measure of the borrower’s financial obligations and total indebtedness 
in the default probability and prepayment models would undoubtedly improve the 
accuracy of the model.  Of these concerns, the enhancements that would most impact 
NPV performance are a comprehensive LTV measure – including all subordinate liens – 
and a measure of mortgage-related back-end DTI.  Where principal is used or where 
mortgage-related back-end DTI is changed through HAMP’s companion modification 
program for second liens (2MP), the default model does not adequately capture the 
change in the default probability generated by the combined HAMP and 2MP 
modifications, which is critical to determining the modification’s relative value.  In most 
standard HAMP modifications, where LTV or back-end DTI are not independently 
altered, these omissions have a smaller impact, since the coefficients were specified using 
a loan population likely resembling the HAMP population in its junior lien distribution.  
Over time, better data may become available on borrowers’ total mortgage debt burdens, 
if not total debt burdens. 
 
A related issue is the treatment of principal reductions on borrower performance.  
Because principal forgiveness had been rare before HAMP, and consequently its impact 
on redefault could not independently be assessed, the NPV default model assumes that 
principal reductions would impact redefault rates as would equity from any other source, 
such as a down payment or a change in house prices.  This assumption may prove faulty.  
Unobservable borrower characteristics are likely correlated with negative equity, 
especially within geographic regions, and principal reduction to 115 MTMLTV may not 
deliver the same performance as the 115 MTMLTV loans we currently observe.  
Likewise, the model assumes that payment reductions would produce identical reductions 
in default, no matter how the sequence of waterfall steps produces the reduced payment. 
The empirical question of whether, for example, a borrower responds similarly to a term 
extension as to a rate reduction with the same payment impact has yet to be resolved. 
 
 Model Inputs 
 
A criticism of the NPV model could be the lack of granularity in its geographically 
varying inputs.  Those familiar with local real estate markets often note that REO 
discounts and foreclosure timelines can vary dramatically by city-block.  Though there 
are practical limitations to the granularity we can obtain consistently across regions, the 
observation that the model’s accuracy would be improved by better capturing the local 
real estate market is correct. The statistical obstacles to doing so, however, are formidable, 
and making such changes without sufficient statistical power would introduce 
considerable noise to the model.  
 
Model performance would also be improved by richer data on the time-path of redefault.  
When several years of performance data are available, it will be possible to revisit the 
assumption that all redefaults occur 6 months after the initiation of the modification.  At 
that time, the model may be recast in various ways to capture the dynamic behavior of 
default.  For example, as a competing risks hazard model, with a conditional default rate 
curve to complement the conditional prepayment rate curve.   
 
Path forward 
 
The HAMP program was developed in recognition of the need for a standardized process 
for the evaluation and modification of at-risk homeowners.  The NPV model has played 
an important role toward that end.  HAMP has changed the landscape of loan 
modifications – encouraging the use of payment reducing modifications for borrowers 
with serious affordability issues.  Similarly, HAMP has encouraged the systematic 
evaluation of borrowers using well-documented, defensible models.  Going forward, we 
expect that NPV evaluation will remain part of the standard servicing toolkit and that 
NPV modeling will continue to improve as the results of HAMP and other modification 
experiences improve our understanding of the behavior of at-risk homeowners and 
information systems broaden the scope and richness of feasible inputs.  Ultimately 
widespread use of well -specified NPV models will result in fewer missed opportunities 
 for value-enhancing modifications, fewer non-value-enhancing modifications, and better 
outcomes for investors, homeowners, and servicers.  This may be one of the enduring 
legacies of HAMP.  
 
Appendix:  Additional HAMP Features 
 
Investor restrictions on permissible modification structures take precedence over the 
HAMP modification, so individual borrowers may have modification terms that are 
somewhat different than the standard HAMP modification.  Aside from investor 
restrictions, servicers are allowed discretion only in the use of principal reduction, which 
they may introduce at any stage of the waterfall. 
In addition, as of October 1, 2010, servicers are required to evaluate borrowers with 
substantial negative equity, e.g., LTV greater than 115 percent, using an alternative 
waterfall that includes as its first step a principal write-down to 115 LTV.  This principal 
reduction is phased over 3 years, so that a borrower who remains successful for the first 
three years of the modification gets one-third of the principal reduction at the end of each 
year.  The borrower also receives the value of the write-down upon prepayment, either 
through refinance or through sale of the home. The investor receives an extra subsidy for 
principal write-down offered with this 3-year phased structure, but principal reduction is 
not required, regardless of whether it appears NPV-improving relative to the HAMP 
modification. 
HAMP directs additional subsidies toward preventive modifications.  Both servicers and 
investors are eligible for additional compensation for modifying at-risk current 
borrowers, or borrowers in “imminent default”.  This incentive encourages servicers to 
proactively evaluate their servicing portfolios for imminently distressed loans and 
compensates the investor for the inevitable “Type II” errors resulting from pre-emptive 
modification: some loans will be modified that may not have ultimately defaulted. 
Investors are also eligible for additional subsidies in areas with recent price declines.  A 
source of risk in modifying a delinquent loan in an area where prices continue to appear 
 unstable is that redefault restarts the foreclosure timeline and lowers the investor’s 
recovery in foreclosure by the intervening price depreciation.  The risk of further price 
depreciation increases the appeal of an immediate foreclosure.  The Home Price 
Depreciation payment compensates investors directly for this risk.  The size of the 
payment reflects the unpaid principal balance and LTV of the loans and the MSA’s recent 
price declines.  
All of these incentives have a pay-for-success structure.  The incentive payments 
continue only for as long as the borrower remains in an active, performing modification. 
Servicer implementations of the NPV model are subject to a compliance regime to ensure 
that both the model logic and their input definitions were consistent with the Treasury-
supported web-based model used by smaller servicers.  The compliance process evolved 
considerably and eventually the entire modification pipeline fell under the NPV 
compliance agents’ purview, including input management, data logic, output 
management, and data submission.  Ultimately, the NPV model has been the most 
thoroughly monitored component of the HAMP program. 
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